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Abstract
In this study, we formulate positive and negative externalities caused by
changes in the supply of shared vehicles as ride sharing games. The study
aims to understand the price of anarchy (PoA) and its improvement via a co-
ordination technique in ride sharing games. A critical question is whether
ride sharing games exhibit a pure Nash equilibrium (pNE) since the PoA
bound assumes it. Our result shows a sufficient condition for a ride sharing
game to have a finite improvement property and a pNE similar to potential
games. This is the first step to analyze PoA bound and its improvement by co-
ordination in ride sharing games. We also show an example of coordinating
players in ride sharing games using signaling and evaluate the improvement
in the PoA.
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1 Introduction
Congestion and effective resource allocation are traditional problems that game
theory has been trying to solve. As populations are increasingly concentrated in
big cities, the congestion problem becomes more critical. One practical way to
solve the congestion problem is sharing of unused resources. For example, even
during heavy traffic congestion, many vehicles have empty seats. Similarly, many
empty vehicles occupy limited parking spaces in urban areas while people struggle
to find an empty taxi. Besides the transportation field, we can find examples such
as unused buildings, empty restaurants, and idle workers.
However, the sharing of unused resources is not realized unless there are match-
ing demands of multiple users. Empty vehicle seats are shared among passengers
only if they have a common part on their routes. A vehicle is shared only if the
destination of a driver is equal to the origin of another driver. If people behave
selfishly, the probability of matching the demand for sharing becomes small, lead-
ing to the problem of demand coordination and incentive design.
Particular to the sharing of vehicles is that positive and negative externalities
of one player’s route change are propagated to other players who do not choose the
relevant routes via changes in vehicle supply. Consider a chain of vehicle sharing
in which player 1 first drives a vehicle from A to B, then player 2 drives the same
vehicle from B to C, and player 3 drives the vehicle from C to D. If player 1 quits
to use the vehicle, player 2 and even 3 cannot use the vehicle even though player
3 does not share any part of his route with player 1. Because classical congestion
games only focus on externalities among players who choose the same routes, it is
necessary to consider alternative games that model externalities via vehicle supply
to analyze coordination in vehicle sharing.
This study formulates ride sharing games that model the positive and negative
externalities of choosing vehicles. We also consider how to coordinate players to
improve the efficiency of sharing, i.e., maximizing the operation rate of otherwise
unused vehicles by giving players an incentive. We mainly assume applications in
transportation areas, such as carpooling and ride sharing.
1.1 Related work
Since Rosenthal introduced the congestion game [1], it has been applied to prob-
lems of congestion externalities in several areas such as transportation and com-
munication networks [2]. In this game, players choose a combination of resources
and the players’ payoffs depend on the congestion level, i.e., the number of players
using the same resources. The congestion game is a subclass of potential games,
which feature the finite improvement property (FIP). This property guarantees that
if each player updates his strategy in response to other players by turns, it will re-
duce his private cost and improve the common potential function, which eventually
reaches a local minimum, the pure Nash equilibrium (pNE), where each player has
a deterministic strategy. Because of this property, potential and congestion games
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have been well studied and have wide applications [3].
The negative externalities in congestion games are also well studied. If players
choose their routes selfishly in road networks, it causes loss of social welfare com-
pared to socially optimal routing. The ratio of social cost in a selfish choice to the
one in the social optimal is called the price of anarchy (PoA) and its bounds are
well known, especially for affine cost functions [4]. Studies on PoA bound assume
that a game has a pNE. Because of the property of always having a pNE, most PoA
studies have focused on congestion games.
A major difference between vehicle sharing and traffic routing problems is ve-
hicle supply. While players drive their own vehicles in traditional traffic routing
problems, players must find shared vehicles before riding in sharing problems. In
the case of a chain of vehicle sharing from player A via player B to player C, the
choice of player A has externalities not only on player B but those also propagate
to player C, who does not share any common part of route with player A. This
kind of complicated externality is not considered in traditional routing problems
and congestion games.
According to a review of sharing studies in transportation areas [5], there are
few game theory studies on externalities and coordination of players’ moves in ve-
hicle sharing problems. Traditional studies on sharing include the optimization of
vehicle routes for picking up all passengers (the Dial-a-ride problem), problems of
splitting passengers’ fares according to their riding distances, optimization of lo-
cations of carpool stations, and problems of relocation of carpool vehicles among
stations. Those studies mainly focus on optimization problems under given moves
(origins and destinations) of passengers and fixed drivers of vehicles, and there-
fore, do not analyze the PoA when passengers strategically choose their moves in
response to the moves of other passengers and vehicles. The review states that
there are no studies on coordination of players’ moves to improve the efficiency of
sharing or reduce the PoA.
There are several studies that examine the coordination of players in traditional
traffic routing and congestion games. One promising technique for coordination is
the mechanism design, which mainly provides monetary incentives for players to
change their behavior in a coordinated manner. Christodoulou studied coordination
mechanism in congestion games [6].
Another relatively new technique for coordination is signaling, in which a me-
diator provides information for players to control their beliefs on uncertain envi-
ronments, and accordingly, the expected payoff and resulting choices when there
is information asymmetry between the mediator and players [7–9]. Most recent
studies are based on the revelation principle, which proved the existence of in-
centive compatible recommendations of choices equivalent to the raw information
inducing the same choices [10]. Rogers applied differential privacy techniques
originally from database security to traffic routing problems for mitigating con-
gestions by sending noisy incentive compatible recommendations of routes [11].
Vasserman also applied recommendations to traffic routing and analyzed how the
PoA improved [12].
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1.2 Our contributions and paper structure
This study proposes ride sharing games as a formulation of positive and negative
externalities caused by changes in the supply of shared vehicles. The study’s ob-
jective is to understand the PoA and its improvement via a coordination technique
in ride sharing games. A critical question is whether ride sharing games have a
pNE since the PoA bound assumes it. Our result shows a sufficient condition for
a ride sharing game to have a FIP and a pNE similar to potential games. This is
the first step to analyze PoA bound and its improvement by coordination in ride
sharing games. We also show an example of coordinating players in ride sharing
games using signaling and evaluate the improvement in the PoA.
Section 2 provides a formulation of ride sharing games and other setups. Sec-
tion 3 presents the main results on a condition of ride sharing games to have pNE
and its proof. Section 4 presents graphic examples of ride sharing games and coor-
dination of players by signaling.
2 The Models
2.1 Ride sharing games
A ride sharing game is defined as a tuple G =< N ,M, T ,G,A, µ, c >, where
• N = {1, . . . , N} is a finite set of players. A player i ∈ N represents an user
of shared vehicles. −i represents all players except for i.
• M = {1, . . . ,M} is a finite set of vehicles. Each vehicle m ∈ M has a
common seating capacity w ∈ N>0.
• G =< V, E > is a directed graph that has a finite set of nodes V = {1, . . . , V }
and a finite set of edges E = {1, . . . , E}. G is a simple graph but each node
has a loop to itself. A node v ∈ V represents a place and an edge e ∈ E
represents a road. Players and vehicles move on G.
• T = {1, . . . , T} is a finite set of time that partitions the day. Each player
and vehicle is located on a node at time t ∈ T and finishes a move on an
edge during period (t, t+ 1).
• R is a set of all paths with length T−1 on G. A path r = (v1, e1, v2, e2, . . . , eT−1, vT ) ∈
R represents a round trip of a player on a day. We denote rk ⊆ r if rk is a
induced path of r. r− rk is a complement of rk which is also a induced path
of r including all edges not in rk. r is a common path r = r1
⋂
r2 if and
only if r ⊆ r1 and r ⊆ r2.
• Ai ⊂ R is a set of strategies of player i. A = ×
i∈N
Ai is a set of strategy pro-
files. ai ∈ Ai is a round trip of player i and a ∈ A is a strategy profile. a−i
represents a strategy profile of all players except for i. A strategy update is
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denoted as (a, bi, i) when a original strategy profile is a and player i update
a strategy from ai to bi.
• µ(i, t,a) :< N , T ,A >→ M is a map that represents the allocation of
player i to vehicle m during each period (t, t + 1) depending on strategy
profile a. In the case where no vehicle is allocated to player i, µ(i, t,a) = ∅.
Each vehicle m moves together with allocated player i on the same edge
where the player moves. sm(t,a) represents the number of players riding on
vehicle m during period (t, t+ 1) when the strategy profile is a.
• ce(w, sm) :< N>0,N≥0 >→ R≥0 is a cost function of a player riding on
vehicle m on edge e. c = {ce|e ∈ E} is a set of cost functions of all edges.
The total cost of player i on a day is ci(a) =
∑
et∈ai ce(w, sµ(i,t,a)(t,a)).
In this study, we consider one-shot games, where players simultaneously choose
whole round trips a on the day. We assume that cost function ce is monotone de-
creasing for sm when sm < w and monotone increasing when sm ≥ w.
2.2 Basic notions of potential games
Here we prepare the basic concepts of potential games used in the rest of the pa-
per. A pure Nash equilibrium (pNE) of game G =< N ,A, c > is defined as a
deterministic strategy profile a ∈ A if and only if no player can reduce his cost by
updating his deterministic strategy from a.
While not all games have a pNE, some games always have a pNE. In particular,
the following property guarantees the existence of a pNE.
Definition 1 (Finite improvement property). A game has a finite improvement
property (FIP) if a strategy profile of the game always converges to a pure Nash
equilibrium by updating each player’s strategy, by turns, finite times.
When a game has an FIP, a pNE can be found by players updating their strate-
gies one player at a step. Therefore, it is unnecessary to search the whole set of
strategy profiles and the computational cost to find a pNE is reduced.
A potential game is gameGwhich has a potential function Φ defined as follows
[13].
Definition 2 ((Ordinal) potential game). Φ : A → R is a (ordinal) potential func-
tion and G is a (ordinal) potential game if
sgn(Φ(bi,a−i)− Φ(ai,a−i)) = sgn(ci(bi,a−i)− ci(ai,a−i)). (1)
The following theorem guarantees that potential games have an FIP and then a
pNE.
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Theorem 1. If a potential game has a potential function with a finite amount of
values, the game has an FIP.
Proof. Starting from an arbitrary strategy profile a, each player updates their strat-
egy by turns to minimize his cost. From the definition, it also reduces the value of
the potential function until it reaches a local minimum. At that point, no player can
reduce his cost and it is a pNE. From Definition 1, it also has an FIP.
In applications such as transportation and communication networks, problems
are often formulated as a minimization of a social cost, which is the total cost of
all players. Normally, a social cost in a pNE is not the same as in the optimal. The
ratio between the cost of a pNE and an optimal cost is called the price of anarchy
(PoA) and is defined as follows [4].
Definition 3 (Price of anarchy). The price of anarchy ρ(G) of game G is
ρ(G) =
C(a∗)
C(aopt)
(2)
where C(a) is a social cost of strategy profile a, a∗ is pNE and aopt is the social
optimal.
Since the PoA assume a pNE, former studies on the PoA have focused on
games with a pNE, such as congestion games.
2.3 Bayesian ride sharing games
We consider cases where players have incomplete information on vehicle alloca-
tions. A Bayesian ride sharing game is an extension of a ride sharing game and
defined as Gb =< N ,M, T ,G,A,X ,P, µ, c > where
• X is a set of possible values of an exogenous variable x ∈ X , which affects
the allocation of vehicles µ.
• µ(i, t,a|x) is the allocation of vehicles depending on x. Similarly, sm(t,a|x)
is the number of players on vehiclem depending on x and ci(a|x) is the cost
of player i depending on x.
• pi(x) : X → [0, 1] is a probability distribution on X of player i, which
represents his belief. P = {pi|i ∈ N} is a set of probability distributions of
all players.
• Definitions of other elements of Gb are the same as those of ride sharing
game G.
Examples of exogenous variable x are initial vehicle locations and traffic acci-
dents. Each player chooses ai to minimize his expected cost, which is EX [ci] =∑
x∈X ci(a|x)pi(x).
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A pure Bayesian Nash equilibruim (pBNE) of a bayesian game is a similar
concept to pNE of a deterministic game that is defined as a deterministic strategy
profile a ∈ A if and only if no player can reduce his expected cost by updating his
deterministic strategy from a.
2.4 Signaling on Bayesian ride sharing games
In this study, we use the Bayes correlated equilibrium (BCE) [8] as a signaling
technique of a mediator to coordinate players. A BCE is a conditional distribution
σ(aˆ|x) of a random recommendation aˆ, which is incentive compatible (IC) as
defined below.
Definition 4 (Incentive compatible). A recommendation policy σ(aˆ|x) is incentive
compatible if∑
aˆ−i,x
pi(x)σ(aˆ|x)ci(aˆi, aˆ−i|x) ≤
∑
aˆ−i,x
pi(x)σ(aˆ|x)ci(ai, aˆ−i|x), ∀i∀aˆi. (3)
Given the cost function of the mediator cs(a|x), the problem of the media-
tor is to design an optimal IC recommendation that makes players coordinate to
minimize their cost. The problem is expressed as follows.
maxσ Ex[cs(aˆ|x)]
s.t.
∑
aˆ−i,x pi(x)σ(aˆ|x)ci(aˆi, aˆ−i|x) ≤
∑
aˆ−i,x pi(x)σ(aˆ|x)ci(ai, aˆ−i|x), ∀i∀aˆi.
(4)
3 Result
Here, we discuss when ride sharing games have a pNE in order to evaluate the PoA
of a game and its improvement by coordination.
We first start with the following negative result in most general cases.
Theorem 2. There exist ride sharing games that do not have an FIP.
Proof. The example in Section 4.1 shows the case in which the strategy updates of
players are caught in an infinite loop, which will not converge to any pNE.
If all ride sharing games fall into this case, it is hard to apply theory of PoA.
However, we found cases where ride sharing games have an FIP. Intuitively, cost
functions ce become monotone decreasing when N ≤ w and then ride sharing
games have a structure of increasing returns and are locked in to a pNE [14]. Be-
fore proceeding, we introduce several notions here.
LetMet(a) andNet(a) be the number of vehicles and players on edge e during
period (t, t + 1), respectively. The change in Net by a strategy update (a, bi, i) is
defined as follows.
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∆Net(a, bi, i) = Net(bi,a−i)−Net(a). (5)
Definition 5 (No-vehicle-loss update). A strategy update (a, bi, i) is no-vehicle-
loss if Met(bi,a−i) 6= 0,∀{et : et ∈ bi,Met(a) > 0}.
An allocation map µ of a ride sharing game can be divided into path allocation
µr and seat allocation µs. Path allocation determines the paths of vehicles. Once
an edge on which a vehicle moves has been fixed, seat allocation determines the
allocation of players to vehicles on the edge. The following path allocation assumes
that the more demands there are on an edge, the more vehicles are allocated to it.
Definition 6 (Linear path allocation). A linear path allocation µr determines an
allocation of Met out of M vehicles on a node v to outgoing edge e ∈ Ev on which
Net players move at t so that
Met = floor(k ∗Net) (6)
where k is a constant that keeps M =
∑
e∈Ev k ∗ Net. The remaining M −∑
et∈Ev Met vehicles are allocated to Ev in the order of k ∗Net−Met.
Definition 7 (Allocated path). r is an allocated path if at least one vehicle is allo-
cated on all edges in r.
Seat allocation is a simple version of bin packing problem. If players are will-
ing to share a vehicle to reduce their costs, it is natural to assume the first-fit algo-
rithm [15] as follows.
Definition 8 (First-fit seat allocation). A seat allocation is first-fit if players are
allocated to a vehicle with the smallest m on the edge until it becomes full.
This definition immediately yields the following lemma.
Lemma 1. If N ≤ w and µs is the first-fit seat allocation, all Net players ride in
the same vehicle if Met > 0.
Definition 9 (First fit linear allocation). An allocation µ is first-fit liner if it com-
prises a linear path allocation and a first-fit seat allocation.
The following lemma states that copying the strategy of another player j always
results in a cost less than cj in some ride sharing games.
Lemma 2. ci(aj ,a−i) ≤ cj(a) if
H1: all players have a common set of actions A0,
H2: N ≤ w,
H3: µs is the first-fit seat allocation, and
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H4: strategy update (a, aj , i) is no-vehicle-loss.
Proof. Let a be a current strategy profile. Now consider strategy update (a, aj , i)
which is always possible because of H1. Since all Net players ride on a vehicle on
the edge according to H2, H3 and Lemma1, the number of players sharing a car
sm now depends only on Met and Net as follows.
sm(t,a) = set(a) =
{
Net(a) if Met(a) ≥ 1
0 if Met(a) = 0.
(7)
Since player i joins in aj and all other players’ strategies remain the same,
∆Net(a, aj , i) ≥ 0,∀et ∈ aj . (8)
Therefore, from H4 and Eq.7, we get
∆set = set(aj ,a−i)− set(a) ≥ 0, ∀et ∈ aj . (9)
From H2, cost functions ce are monotone decreasing such that
ce(w, set(aj ,a−i)) ≤ ce(w, set(a)),∀et ∈ aj . (10)
Then,
ci(aj ,a−i) =
∑
et∈aj
ce(w, set(aj ,a−i)) ≤
∑
et∈aj
ce(w, set(a)) = cj(a). (11)
This completes the proof of Lemma 2.
Definition 10 (Riding path). r is a riding path of player i if r ⊆ ai and r is an
allocated path.
Definition 11 (Necessary path). r ∈ Rn is a necessary path if
ci(ai ⊇ r,a−i) ≤ ci(bi 6⊇ r,a−i), ∀i,a−i (12)
when r is an allocated path.
Definition 12 (Sufficient path). r ∈ Rs is a sufficient path if rc is a riding path of
player i and
ci(rc = r,a−i) ≤ ci(rc 6= r,a−i), ∀i,a−i. (13)
Definition 13 (Disjoint path set). A set of pathsR is disjoint if
ri
⋂
rj = ∅,∀{i 6= j : ri, rj ∈ R}. (14)
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Definition 14 (Driver and passener). Let r be a necessary path and rc ⊇ r is a
riding path of player i. i is a driver if rc ⊃ r. i is a passenger if rc = r.
Lemma 3. Once a player update his strategy and becomes a driver, he cannot
improve his cost by updating his strategy again if
H1: all players have a common set of actions A0,
H2: M = 1,
H3: N ≤ w,
H4: µs is the first-fit seat linear allocation, and
H5: G has a disjoint set of necessary and sufficient pathsRns.
Proof. Let i be a driver who has a riding path rc including a necessary and suf-
ficient path r. From H2, H5 and Definitions 12 and 14, all other players update
their strategies to be passengers of r. Then the number of players on r increases
compaired to the one when i lastly updated his strategy. Since Rns is disjoint, the
number of players on the other rns ∈ Rns decreases. Then the cost for the part
r stays minimal since cost functions are monotone decreasing. Meanwhile, i is a
only player who is on rc − r since all other players are passengers of r. Then the
cost for the part ai − r is independent of a−i and stay minimal since when i up-
dated strategy last time. Therefore, the cost of whole path ai is minimal and then
player i cannot update his strategy.
The following theorem tells us there is a class of ride sharing games that has
an FIP.
Theorem 3. A ride sharing game G has an FIP if
H1: all players have a common set of actions A0,
H2: M = 1,
H3: N ≤ w,
H4: µs is the first-fit seat linear allocation, and
H5: G has a disjoint set of necessary and sufficient pathsRns.
Proof. Let Φ be a function defined as
Φ(a) = min
k
ck(a). (15)
Let a be the current strategy profile, let j be a player who has the current minimum
cost among all players, and let his current profile be aj . Then, Φ becomes
Φ(a) = cj(a). (16)
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If j has no riding path, no player are allocated a vehicle because of Definition
11. In this case, player i can update his strategy to bi, which has a necessary
allocated path. From Definition 11, bi updates the minimum cost and accordingly
Φ(bi,a−i) ≤ Φ(a).
If j has a riding path rj , it must include a necessary path r because of Definition
11. If i is not a driver, he can copy the strategy of j as bi = aj without reducingNet
for all et ∈ rj and from H4 the strategy update (a, aj , i) is no-vehicle-loss. Then
from Lemma 2, it updates the minimum cost and accordingly Φ(bi,a−i) ≤ Φ(a).
If j has a riding path rj and i is a driver, i cannot update his strategy according
to Lemma 3.
Accordingly, if a player can update his strategy and reduce cost, it also reduces
Φ(a) or a player cannot update his strategy. Then, Φ(a) satisfies Definition 2 and
is a potential function. Consequently, from Theorem 1, game G has an FIP. This
complete the proof of Theorem 3.
Although Theorem 3 has several assumptions and covers only a limited class
of ride sharing games, the following theorem indicates a possibility of relaxation
of the assumptions.
Theorem 4. The assumptions in Theorem 3 are not necessary conditions.
Proof. The example in Section 4.3 shows the case where a game has an FIP even
though it does not satisfy all the assumptions in Theorem 3.
4 Examples
In this section, we provide graphical examples of ride sharing games. In Sections
4.1 to 4.3 we assume the following games.
• N = 3, T = 5, V = 4.
• G is a complete graph but each node has a loop edge connected to itself to
represent staying of players.
• Initial location of players is node 1 and that of vehicles is node 2.
• ai must include nodes 3 and 4 for all players.
• µ is the first-fit linear allocation.
All edges have the same cost function, which is
ce =
{
d
sm+1
if sm ≤ w
d(1− w2sm(w+1)) if sm > w
(17)
where d = 0 for loop edges and d = 1 for others.
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4.1 A case of non-FIP game
Here, we assume M = 2 and w = 1 and then G does not have an FIP. Figure
1 shows the initial state of this game. The numbers represent nodes v; a, b and c
represent the players, and ∗ represents a vehicle. Figures 2 and 3 show how strategy
updates make a loop and the FIP is broken. In Figure 2, there are two drivers (a
and c) and b is the player with the minimum cost. However, in Figure 3, a updates
his strategy to quit being a driver and become a passenger to reduce his cost, and
b loses a vehicle and his cost increases. In this case, w = 1 < N so that player
b cannot reduce cost by copying another player’s strategy according to Lemma 2.
Then, b must choose the other vehicle to reduce his cost again as in Figure 4. This
negative externality makes an infinite loop of this driver switching behavior and
the game loses its FIP.
Figure 1: Initial strategy profile of non-FIP game
4.2 A case of FIP game
Here, we assume M = 1 and w = 4 and that G satisfies all the assumptions in
Theorem 3 and has an FIP. In this case, the game immediately converges into a
pNE as in Figure 5. The best update of player a is to pickup the vehicle and all
other players because the vehicle has enough capacity.
4.3 Another case of FIP game
Here, we consider another case where M = 2 and w = 4 and the initial profile
is the same as that in Figure 2. In this case, a updates the same strategy as that in
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Figure 2: Two drivers
Figure 3 and increases the cost of player b. However, in this case, b does not have
to pick up the other vehicle but can be a passenger as in Figure 6, and this is the
same pNE as that in Figure 5. While this game does not satisfy H2 in Theorem
3, it has an FIP. This means that the assumptions in Theorem 3 are not necessary
conditions.
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Figure 3: Negative externality
Figure 4: A player’s restarting update
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Figure 5: A pNE of the FIP game
Figure 6: Same pNE of the FIP game
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4.4 An example of signaling in ride sharing games
Here, we show how signaling can improve the efficiency of sharing by giving play-
ers an incentive to coordinate with each other in a Bayesian ride sharing game.
Game G is defined as follows.
• N = 2, V = 3, T = 4,M ≤ 1.
• G and initial locations are shown in Figure 7. All nodes have loop edges to
themselves.
• ai must include node 3 for all players.
• µ is the first-fit linear allocation.
• There is an uncertainty x ∈ X = {0, 1} regarding the existence of the
vehicle. x = 0 means M = 0 and x = 1 means M = 1.
• All players have a common prior pi(x = 0) = 0.5, ∀i.
For each x, this game satisfies the assumptions in Theorem 3. There are only
two distinct options for each player thatA = {C,D}. C = (1, 2, 3, 1) is a trip that
visits nodes in this order. On the other hand, D = (1, 1, 3, 1). All edges except for
loop edges have the same cost function. If a player does not use the vehicle, the
cost is 8. If a player drives alone, the cost is 6. If two players share the vehicle, the
cost is 1. The cost of loop edges is zero. The cost matrices of this game are shown
in Tables 1 and 2.
Figure 7: A Bayesian ride sharing game
The expected cost matrix is shown in Table 3. This matrix has the structure of
a prisoner’s dilemma and pBNE is a = (D,D), which means no players share the
vehicle.
Now we consider a system to coordinate players to share the unused vehicle by
the BCE, as described in Section 2.4. A system cost can be denoted as cs(a|x) =∑
i∈N ci(a|x). Then, the problem of the system is denoted as Eq.4, which is the
search for an optimal recommendation policy σ(aˆ|x) as in Table 4. The problem
becomes a linear programming and Table 5 presents a solution. This incentive
compatible recommendation induces the coordination of players as a BCE, where
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Table 1: ci(a1, a2|x = 0)
C D
C 20,20 20,16
D 16,20 16,16
Table 2: ci(a1, a2|x = 1)
C D
C 10,10 15,9
D 9,15 16,16
Table 3: Ex[ci(a1, a2|x)]
C D
C 15,15 17.5,12.5
D 12.5,17.5 16,16
Table 4: σ(aˆ1, aˆ2|x)
σ(aˆ1, aˆ2|0) σ(aˆ1, aˆ2|1)
C D C D
C α0 β0 C α1 β1
D β0 1− α0 − 2β0 D β1 1− α1 − 2β1
Table 5: Optimal σ(aˆ1, aˆ2|x)
σ(aˆ1, aˆ2|0) σ(aˆ1, aˆ2|1)
C D C D
C 0 0 C 0.06 0.47
D 0 1 D 0.47 0
Ex[cs(aˆ, x)] = 27.9, which is better than the one of pBNE Ex[cs(a|x)] = 32.
Since Ex[cs(a|x)] = 26 in social optimum, the PoA is improved from 1.23 of
pBNE to 1.07 of BCE.
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